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Abstract
Background: The focus of management in many complex systems is shifting towards facilitation, adaptation, building
resilience, and reducing vulnerability. Resilience management requires the development and application of general
heuristics and methods for tracking changes in both resilience and vulnerability. We explored the emergence of
vulnerability in the South African domestic ostrich industry, an animal production system which typically involves 3–4
movements of each bird during its lifetime. This system has experienced several disease outbreaks, and the aim of this study
was to investigate whether these movements have contributed to the vulnerability of this system to large disease
outbreaks.
Methodology/Principal Findings: The ostrich production system requires numerous movements of birds between different
farm types associated with growth (i.e. Hatchery to juvenile rearing farm to adult rearing farm). We used 5 years of
movement records between 2005 and 2011 prior to an outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N2). These data
were analyzed using a network analysis in which the farms were represented as nodes and the movements of birds as links.
We tested the hypothesis that increasing economic efficiency in the domestic ostrich industry in South Africa made the
system more vulnerable to outbreak of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N2). Our results indicated that as time
progressed, the network became increasingly vulnerable to pathogen outbreaks. The farms that became infected during
the outbreak displayed network qualities, such as significantly higher connectivity and centrality, which predisposed them
to be more vulnerable to disease outbreak.
Conclusions/Significance: Taken in the context of previous research, our results provide strong support for the application
of network analysis to track vulnerability, while also providing useful practical implications for system monitoring and
management.
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Introduction
The long-term sustainability of modern society depends on the
development of general principles and heuristics that allow us to
work with and manage complex processes without collapsing our
own life-support systems [1]. Policy and management for complex
systems are increasingly being forced away from traditional
optimization approaches - as they fail - and into a paradigm that
focuses on facilitation, adaptation, and resilience [2–4]. Typical
behaviors of complex systems include amplifying and regulating
feedbacks between cause and effect; non-linear responses to small
perturbations; and the potential for unexpected outcomes [5].
Such behaviors can be difficult to quantify and understand,
particularly when their outcomes depend on irreducible uncer-
tainties [6]. As a result, the current cutting-edge focus of research
on the vulnerability of complex systems is on understanding
indicators or warning signs of collapse rather than on predicting
them from first principles [7,8].
Holling and Meffe [2] have argued that as complex production
systems improve their efficiency or net production, they become
increasingly vulnerable to perturbations and surprises. For
example, monocultures often suffer heavily from pest outbreaks;
forests that are managed for wood production may become
vulnerable to fire; and many of the oceanic fisheries that have been
managed for ‘maximum sustained yield’ have collapsed [9–11].
Holling and Meffe [2] termed the tendency for managers to
collapse the system, following attempts to maximize production of
a single quantity, the ‘‘pathology of natural resource manage-
ment’’. Despite a wealth of individual cases that support the
generality of the problem, however, there are relatively few
empirical studies that have rigorously tracked changes in
vulnerability (or its converse, resilience) as a managed production
system has attempted to maximize its outputs.
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Animal production systems offer a set of case studies that are
data-rich, are extremely important for economies and livelihoods,
and from which vulnerability can be explored in greater depth.
Cumming and Norberg [12] have argued that complex systems
can be described from the complementary perspectives of
asymmetries, networks, and information processing. Here we
develop and apply a network approach to understanding the
vulnerability of animal production systems to disease.
Where traditional mean field, metapopulation and lattice based
models assumed homogeneity in social relations or contact within
populations, network analysis incorporates a more appropriate
treatment of connection heterogeneity [13,14]. Networks are
defined as collections of potentially interacting units (termed nodes
or vertices) within a system [15]. Network analysis focuses on the
nature and intensity of interactions and connections (termed links
or edges) between units, rather than purely on the attributes of the
Figure 1. Changes in Network and Node Properties Associated with Increasing Vulnerability. Network Properties – properties of the entire
network which impact vulnerability (a) Density (ratio of edges to nodes) – As this ratio increases, there is an increase in connections between nodes,
increasing the potential paths for disease spread. (b) Number of components (number of independent/isolated sub groups) – A decrease in the
number of isolated groups increases the reachability of any random node (c) Giant Component (largest independent/isolated sub group) – if the
largest component contracts infection, this infection can spread further through the Giant Component compared to smaller, more isolated
components which will make the whole network more vulnerable. (d) Link Weight (strength of relationship/number of units moved or frequency of
movement) – As more units are moved or units are moved more frequently, there is an increase in the chance of moving infected individuals. Node
Properties – properties of each node which make the node more vulnerable or impact the vulnerability of the rest of the network. Black node = focal node
(e) Degree (number of edges) – increases in the number of edges any node has increases the vulnerability of that node to potential transmission
(must have contact/connection to transfer infection) (f) Betweenness (how often a node lies on the shortest path between two other nodes) – with
low vulnerability the focal node has low betweenness and for the highest vulnerability the focal node has maximum betweeness, where every node
must go through the focal node to reach any other node. (g) Infection chain (the number of nodes that can be reached by the focal node, accounting
for timing of movements) – the focal node has a single edge (*), and those edges in the network which are formed before this edge (i.e. those animal
transfers which happen before the focal node formed) cannot contribute to the infection chain, and are depicted with a dashed line. Edges which
form after this edge are depicted with a solid line. With the lowest vulnerability, the focal node can only form a chain of one, because the outgoing
edge from the next node has already formed. With medium vulnerability, the subsequent edge is formed after the focal node’s edge, thus stock could
move from the focal node to 3 other nodes, giving it an infection chain of 3. In the final figure all movements occur subsequent to the formation of
the focal node and thus the infection chain for this node increases to 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g001
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units themselves. By representing complex systems as collections of
nodes and links, network analysis creates models that can be
analyzed using standard mathematical techniques [16]. Network
analysis has wide applicability in understanding systems as diverse
as research collaborations, the Internet, and trophic interactions
[17–19], and has been used to identify similar underlying
mechanisms across a range of complex systems. If network
analysis can be used to articulate general principles for epidemi-
ological management [20] these should then be applicable to
understanding and managing vulnerability in other complex
systems.
Few datasets include contact structure data that are both
relevant to pathogen transmission in large populations and
sufficiently detailed to test the relevance of the network based
approach [21]. Movement records of domestic livestock and
poultry often provide an exception, where meticulous monitoring
can produce large, detailed databases of contacts or movements
that are relevant to the potential spread of disease. In recent years,
network analysis has emerged as a central method for evaluating
epidemics and disease transmission in many animal production
systems. Notable examples include analysis of Foot and Mouth
Disease in the UK [21–23] and Avian Influenza in the UK
Figure 2. Full ostrich movement network visualization with the least connected nodes (degree ,20) not shown. The farm ID numbers
for the 10 most connected nodes are displayed, and all farms which tested positive for HPAI are shaded red and the farm ID number displayed for the
ten farms with the highest degree.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g002
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[24–27]. These investigations into specific outbreaks have led to
advances in modeling and monitoring of both disease transmission
and epidemic outbreaks within domestic production industries
[28–30].
While existing studies have applied network analysis to identify
the origin of disease outbreaks or monitor vulnerability in non-
infected networks, studies quantifying vulnerability in systems that
have experienced actual epidemics are scarce. Robinson et al. [23]
investigated UK cattle trade network evolution over time to
understand the emergent properties of production systems that
create vulnerability, but did not link their study to a system
collapse or a disease outbreak. Rautureau et al. [31] investigated
vulnerability to disease in the French swine industry, concluding
that while the network displayed local or regional vulnerability, the
entire network was relatively disjointed. While both studies
identified a tendency for networks to self organize towards
vulnerability, neither linked their findings to an actual outbreak,
leaving the generality of their results unclear. Here we apply a
more rigorous test by examining changes in network-derived
measures of vulnerability over the five years preceding a severe
avian influenza outbreak in an ostrich production system in South
Africa.
Ostrich Production in South Africa as a Case Study
We examined the vulnerability of an ostrich production system
using a dataset of over 18,000 transfers of domestic ostriches
between farms within the Western Cape of South Africa during
the period September 2005–March 2011. The dynamics of ostrich
production are complex, with efforts to increase production
interacting with periods of drought, fluctuations in prices of other
locally produced commodities (many farmers also produce crops
and some farm sheep as well as ostriches), international demand
for ostrich products, and pathogen outbreaks. Meat production,
constituting about a fifth of the value of each bird, and
international meat exports can be used to provide an index of
overall ostrich production in this region [32]. When birds are
transferred between locations they are often incorporated into
holdings with resident birds, allowing mixing and contact. The
industry experienced H5N2 outbreaks in 2004 and 2006; and
from April 2011, an exceptionally large H5N2 outbreak resulted in
42 farms testing positive for the disease, severe economic losses,
and the government paying out over 6,500,000 USD in
compensation. The presence of H5N2 in this system, coupled
with its significant economic growth and near-collapse, make it
well suited for testing the hypothesis that the emergent behavior
and structure of networks during times of increased production (or,
Figure 3. The monthly number of nodes (farms) and edges (ostrich movement events) occurring in the Western Cape, between
September 2005 and March 2011. The vertical lines occur mark December of every year.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g003
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as during the financial crisis, increases in production efficiency)
can be used to track system vulnerability to disease epidemics.
Quantifying Vulnerability Using Network Metrics
The wide range of metrics used to measure properties of
networks can be broadly split into network level properties
(Figure 1a–d), which focus on system-wide relations and structures,
and those measured at the node level (Figure 1e–g). In-depth
understanding can be gained by comparing network and node
measures of vulnerability over time.
The most straightforward property measured at the network
level is its density, which gives a relative measure of numbers of
edges to numbers of nodes (Figure 1a). Edge density captures the
proportional network-wide frequency of interactions, which in
turn provides information about the transmission potential of a
density-dependent pathogen [33–35]. Increased edge density
(without an increase in network size) is likely to coincide with
greater vulnerability to pathogen outbreak because the number of
routes for disease transmission has increased. Edge weight
(Figure 1b) can also impact on network vulnerability with greater
weights, representing relationship strength (ie. higher numbers of
units such as number of ostriches moved) and/or the frequency of
contact (ie. number of shipments of ostriches/units), creating
increased vulnerability [36].
Real world networks are often composed of multiple connected
subgroups, called ‘components’, that are isolated from other
components. The number of components greatly affects vulner-
ability to diseases where transmission is based on direct contact
between individuals, because nodes in components that bear no
disease cannot become infected (Figure 1c). In addition, larger
components can allow rapid transmission among nodes, resulting
in more extensive epidemics. Some studies have found that nodes
congregate preferentially in a particular component that then
becomes significantly larger than the others, and have labeled it
the Giant Component (Figure 1d). If large component size is
coupled with a low number of components within the network
(i.e., the ‘all your eggs in one basket’ syndrome), the epidemic
potential of a virulent disease increases [11].
Within a directed contact network (i.e. where links represent
interactions that occur from one entity to another, but not in
reverse, such as movements from a breeding farm to a grower),
two types of component are relevant to pathogen transmission.
‘Weak components’ are connected by directed links, but not all
nodes within a group need to be mutually accessible to all other
nodes. In other words, if a link exists between two nodes,
regardless of direction, they will be in the same weak component
[21,37,38]. The largest weak component in a network is known as
the Giant Weak Component and has been used to estimate the
upper bounds of maximal epidemic size [22,23,39]. The second
type, ‘strong components’, are connected by directed links with
each node mutually accessible to every other node either directly
or indirectly [21,38]. The largest strong component in a network is
known as the Giant Strong Component, and has been used to
estimate the lower bounds of maximal epidemic size [22,23,39].
The directionality and stage dependency of movements in some
production systems reduce the predictive power of the Giant
Strong Component as an overall diagnostic measure of network
vulnerability [39]. In this study the Giant Strong Component over
all months included only four nodes, rendering it ineffectual for
understanding network vulnerability. With a sequential flow of
ostriches through the production system, the likelihood for
reciprocated ties between farms, or fully connected groups of
farms, is low. Similar observations have been made in other
production systems [39].
The most important node level measures for assessing network
vulnerability are those directly related to connectivity. The
simplest is the ‘Degree’, or the number of links a particular node
has (Figure 1e), while ‘Betweenness’ looks at the number of times
Figure 4. The results of a Bfast analysis of the (a) network density and the (b) Max outgoing infection chain. The top frame of each
panel displays the network index at each time step, while the second panel depicts seasonal variation detected in the measure over time. This
variation is then removed and the resulting trend is displayed in panel three. The fourth panel depicts residual variation which cannot be accounted
for in the seasonal variation or trend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g004
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the focal node falls on the shortest path between any two other
nodes (Figure 1f). Betweenness is often equated to the centrality of
a node in a network, with higher values indicating greater
centrality. Nodes with higher degree or betweenness would be
expected to contract disease earlier in an epizootic or epidemic
[9,40].
Contact diseases follow a temporally structured chain of
infection, and thus to study them adequately, both direction and
the temporal sequence of interactions must be considered. One of
the main criticisms of using strong and weak components to infer
susceptibility of disease vulnerability is their lack of temporal
information [39]. Dube et al. [39] and Noremark et al. [29] have
developed methods to assess the temporal elements of ‘infection
Figure 5. The results of a Bfast analysis of (a) the number of birds moved, (b) average ingoing infection chain length, (c) number of
components and (d) Giant Weak Component size. The first frame of each panel displays the network index at each time step, while the second
panel depicts seasonal variation detected in the measure over time. This variation is then removed and the resulting trend is displayed in panel three.
The fourth panel depicts residual variation which cannot be accounted for in the seasonal variation or trend. The vertical lines in the second panel of
image c indicate shifts in the season trends, while the vertical lines in the 3rd panel signify an abrupt change in the trend component of the time
series. The corresponding confidence interval of each shift or change is depicted by horizontal lines below each.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g005
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chains’ in networks (Figure 1g). Any node has the potential to have
an ingoing infection chain, by which it becomes infected, and an
outgoing infection chain, by which it infects other nodes. Ingoing
infection chains examine the series of contacts leading into a
particular node, including both the direction and relative timing of
links, indicating how many nodes could have infected the focal
node. Similarly, the outgoing infection chain assesses all chains
leaving the focal node (considering the timing and direction of
ties), indicating which other nodes the focal node could have
infected [29,38,39].
The application of many network level measures of vulnerability
is well established [17], but few studies have tested their relevance
using data leading up to an actual outbreak. Comparing network
measures of vulnerability to node level measures for infected versus
non-infected nodes over time allows the relationships between
network structure and vulnerability to be tested directly. Both
network and node level measures are affected by connectivity and
centrality and are expected to co-vary if they are adequate
measures of vulnerability. If infected nodes are found to be more
central and more connected than other nodes, this provides
verification of both node and network measures of vulnerability. If
these measures can be used to quantify vulnerability as a system is
managed to optimize or maximize a single output, and if they have
the potential to predict real-world system collapse, then they have
enormous potential to contribute to identifying the thresholds and
tradeoffs that are critical for the sustainable management of




A total of 1617 farms (nodes) participated in the Ostrich
Movement Network (OMN), with 17,955 movement events (edges)
involving 2,677,478 individual bird movements over the entire
time series (Figure 2). Nine strong components were identified in
the full network combining all data across the entire period of
observation. Of these, 8 ranged from 2 to 5 nodes, while the Giant
Weak Component contained 1596 nodes. While the entire
network appears highly connected, greater insight can be gained
by partitioning networks by time. Monthly networks displayed
high variability in the number of nodes and edges, fluctuating
seasonally and in a predictable fashion, as revealed by strong
positive autocorrelation at 2 and 12 months and strong negative
autocorrelation at 6 months when the autocorrelation function
(acf) [41] is applied. The number of nodes and edges in any given
month ranged from 111 to 331 interacting farms and 82 to 444
bird movements, respectively (Figure 2). Seasonal variation has
also been found in other large production systems, such as swine
[39] and cows [29].
Figure 6. The distribution of logged betweenness (nInfected = 23, nNon_Infected =324) and degree (nInfected =42, nNon_Infected = 1575
scores for all farms (white) as well as the farms which tested positive for HPAI (black). A Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that the
infected farms are significantly different from infected farms in the network in both betweenness (p,0.001) and degree (p,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g006
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Seasonal Fluctuations and Temporal Trends in
Vulnerability
Analyses indicated an increase in the number of bird
movements and density of connections in the movement network
over the study period (Figure 3; Figure 4a). Similarly, the numbers
of nodes and edges became increasingly decoupled and weak
components decreased in number while the Giant Weak
Component increased in size with greater numbers of ostrich
movements (Figure 3, Figure 5 a & b). The reduction in
compartmentalization (number of components) and the increase
in connectivity (network density) reduced the system’s resilience to
pathogen outbreaks and were consistent with trends identified in
previous studies examining vulnerability to disease in animal
production systems [21]. The increase in bird movements
occurred in such a way that it aggravated transmission potential,
while increasing the likelihood that an infected bird be transferred
between locations before infection detected. It thus comes as no
surprise that when H5N2 entered the system the initial detection
of disease occurred on a single farm in April 2011, but over 40
farms became infected before the outbreak was contained four
months later.
Both the maximum and average outgoing infection chains for
the monthly networks increased over time, indicating that the
number of other nodes that the focal node could potentially infect
was increasing. The average ingoing infection chain displayed a
weak decreasing trend from 2 to 1.5, although a high residual from
the Bfast analysis leaves this finding inconclusive. The maximum
ingoing infection chain did not reveal seasonal variation,
displaying higher values in 2005 and 2011, but fluctuated between
5 and 15 in the intervening period. In general our findings suggest
that the outgoing infection chain is more useful in quantifying
vulnerability than the ingoing chain, as it is more closely coupled
with seasonal trends affecting other measures and more consistent
over time.
Figure 7. The log of the proportion of infected farms at increasing ingoing (top) and outgoing (bottom) infection chain lengths
during 01/09/2010 - 01/04/2011.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g007
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Tracking Infection Spread
Linking information on the 2011 H5N2 outbreak with changes
in measures of network vulnerability through time provided a
benchmark test of the utility of these measures, and allowed us to
draw links between node and network level measures. Perhaps our
most important finding was that the increase in network
vulnerability could be quantified, via changes in network
properties, using differences in node level measures between
infected and uninfected farms. Wilcoxon signed rank tests for
differences in betweenness and degree between infected and
uninfected farms revealed that infected farms were significantly
more connected (p,0.001) and more central (p,0.001) than the
rest of the network (Figure 6; note that sample sizes for the tests of
degree and betweenness differ due to the exclusion of a high
number of nodes with null betweenness values). Outgoing and
ingoing infection chain lengths for each node were calculated
using a network that included all nodes and edges from September
2010 to April 1 2011, the period identified by Abolnik et al. [42]
for which a form of the H5N2 virus had been in the system, and
thus the movement of the virus was possible. Wilcoxon signed rank
tests revealed that infected farms were more likely to have longer
infection chains than those farms that did not become infected
(Figure 7). Greater infection chain lengths and betweenness and
degree scores for infected farms support the argument that greater
connectivity increased vulnerability to disease outbreaks.
Managing Fragility in Animal Production Systems
Our results show clearly that key attributes of the network
changed in predictable ways as individual farmers attempted to
maximize their profits and as the number of birds moving in the
system increased. In particular, the pattern of ostrich movements
made the system increasingly vulnerable to pathogen outbreaks.
The potential for severe outbreaks could be reduced by
implementing regulations that decrease emergent (network-level)
vulnerability and/or improve monitoring to facilitate earlier
detection of infected birds. Vulnerability could be reduced by
constraining the direction of transfers such that farms could not
exchange birds with farms from which they receive transfers. This
would reduce infection chain lengths and increase the number of
nodes that the disease would have to pass through to infect all
farms (or Average Path Length). Another approach would be to
increase the compartmentalization of the network (i.e. reducing
component size) by limiting the numbers of farms that are
permitted to transfer animals between one another. This would
create units of interaction in which contact with members in the
same neighbourhood is more likely than with farms from other
neighbourhoods. While we have no data for bird interactions
within farms, it is likely that increasing compartmentalization
within farms (i.e. reducing contact among cohorts of birds on the
same farm) would similarly reduce the spread of disease. This
method would reduce emergent network vulnerability because
farms that are internally compartmentalized would essentially act
as multiple nodes, reducing their overall degree, betweenness and
infection chain lengths.
Similarly, disease monitoring efforts are costly, logistically
difficult and time consuming, limiting the number of birds and
farms that can be tested. These efforts could be made more
efficient if monitoring were focused on farms with high node-level
vulnerability scores, and if priority were given to birds in transfers
to or from farms with similarly high node-level vulnerability scores.
While increased regulation is rarely popular with farmers, and
might potentially incur additional costs, it would greatly reduce the
vulnerability of the system to future outbreaks of H5N2 or any
other pathogen introduced to the system.
Figure 8. Ostrich production in South Africa. This process incorporates the movement of birds between a number of different types of farms
before they are sent to the abattoir to be slaughtered. The process begins at hatcheries where eggs are incubated and, once hatched, chicks are
moved to chick rearing farms within 72 hours. This most frequently occurs between September and February each year. The birds remain at these
rearing farms for 2–3 months, when they are moved to adult rearing farms. They remain at these locations until they reach 70–90 kg (for approx. 12–
14 months) when they are moved to quarantine farms. They remain at these farms for ,30 days, and once deemed disease free they are transferred
to an abattoir for slaughter. These last two steps of the production cycle occur primarily between September and February.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0086973.g008
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Conclusions
Our analysis supported the prediction that vulnerability to
Avian Influenza outbreaks would increase as productivity was
maximized in an ostrich production system in South Africa. More
generally, we identified some useful principles for future analyses
of network vulnerability. For instance, being able to analyze
temporal trends was essential to developing a quantitative
understanding of changes in vulnerability; the assembly of
temporally rich data sets will be a priority for further advances
in this area of research. Similarly, giant component approaches
appeared less useful in quantifying vulnerability than analysis of
infection chains. Infection chain analysis was developed in an
epidemiological context but have parallels in many other
disciplines in which network analysis is used (e.g., gene flow,
pollination networks) and offer a valuable addition to this kind of
analysis. Industry standards, the details of the system, and the
transmission behaviors of pathogens can also have a significant
impact on the usefulness of network metrics. Although some
network measures, such as network density, have a wide
application across most disease systems, others (such as the traits
and trends of the components and infection chains) are more
system-specific. Our analysis of vulnerability in an ostrich
movement network, taken together with previous analyses of foot
and mouth disease in the UK [21–23], provides a clear
demonstration that network measures can be used to track
vulnerability in these systems, while offering valuable insights into




Ostrich production within the Western Cape typically involves a
number of types of farm, each specializing in a specific stage of
ostrich growth (Figure 8). This fragmented production system is a
direct result of the excessive capital required for a farm to engage
in multiple stages of production. For example, a hatchery and
raiser facility could cost upwards of 100,000 USD. Additionally, it
is not viable to conduct all stages of production in a single region.
For example, chick raisers in more arid regions have much lower
mortality rates compared with the Oudtshoorn region, where
much of the feedlot-type production industry is based. As a result,
it is not uncommon for a single bird to be moved upwards of 4
times during its life, residing on at least 3–4 different farms. In
addition, the movement of birds is highly directional, with there
being little reason for older birds to return to farms that specialize
in rearing ostrich chicks or young birds.
Within each farm, ostriches are often kept in enclosures. This
allows for frequent contact between new arrivals and current
resident birds. Given that H5N2 is most commonly transmitted via
direct contact with an infected individual, the Ostrich Movement
Network (OMN) represents a plausible route of transmission.
Other potential transmission pathways are via drinking water, wild
birds, surfaces such as transport trucks, and the workers who
accompany birds between locations [43,44,45]. In April 2011 the
highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAI) H5N2 was
detected on an ostrich farm near Oudtshoorn, Western Cape
[46]. By January 2012, 42 farms had tested positive for the virus.
This resulted in the full eradication of stock on all H5N2-positive
farms, the loss of valuable breeding stock, substantial economic
losses within the region, and governmental compensation payouts
in excess of 6.5 million USD.
A Department of Agriculture report [47] indicates that over the
period 2001–2010 ostrich meat production ranged from approx-
imately 6000 tonnes to just short of 10 000 tonnes per season.
Although ostriches provide meat, feathers, and leather, with meat
constituting only about a fifth of the value of an individual bird,
meat production provides an index of overall production. An
avian influenza outbreak in 2006 temporarily halted the export of
ostrich meat to the European Union, where a knock on decrease in
production in the 2007/2008 season was seen. A similar effect has
now been experienced in the 2012/2013 season, where production
decreased to less than half of the production in the 2011/2012
season (SAOBC pers comm). Available evidence suggests that
ostrich movement networks continued to grow and develop during
the 2008 global recession period as farmers attempted to reduce
costs through such mechanisms as improving the survivorship of
ostrich chicks by sending them to specialist rearing farms [43]. In
attempting to either maximize production (during profitable
periods) or reduce costs (during recession periods), the system
thus became increasingly focused on the twin principles of
efficiency and maximized yield. Efficiency is provided by the
greater number of movements of birds, which results in lower
costs; yield increases with the numbers of birds produced.
Data Description
Ostrich movements in the Oudtshoorn region are recorded via
permits issued by the Department of Agriculture of the Western
Cape. The database of records contains the date, source,
destination, batch size, as well as farmer specific information for
each movement. The system has been in operation since 2005,
when it was established following an outbreak of HPAI. The data
available prior to September 2005 and after March 2011 were
incomplete and were excluded from all analyses. The data were
cleaned (i.e., screened for errors and checked against original data
sheets where necessary) and a unique farm ID number was
assigned to each farm in the network. The data set used only
capture movements involving export farms, due to these move-
ments being highly regulated and meticulously recorded. For the
analysis it was assumed that all movements of ostriches to or from
export farms are accounted for in the dataset.
Network Construction
The movement database was used to construct an Ostrich
Movement Network (OMN), which included directed ostrich
movements (edge) between source and destination farms (nodes).
Any two nodes were treated as being connected by a directional
edge if there was at least one movement of ostriches between them
during a particular month.
The movement of ostriches though out the year is not uniform,
with observed seasonal variation in activity based on either the
stages of the ostrich life cycle and climatic conditions. Seasonal
variation is not uncommon in domestic production systems, with
comparable fluctuations observed in the British livestock [22,23]
and poultry [25,26] industries.
To observe system changes over time which related to
vulnerability, movements were grouped by month, rather than
day, allowing for additional network measures (i.e., density) to be
examined through time. To safeguard against the potential
implications of losing finer-grained temporal information that
might be relevant to disease transmission and system vulnerability,
these monthly sub-networks (n = 67) were analyzed using both
static measures (density) and sequential measures (infection
chains).
Time series analysis – vulnerability through time. As a
proxy for production in the system, we tracked the numbers of
birds being moved. To investigate system vulnerability, we used
network density, number of components (strong and weak), the
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size of the Giant Component, average infection chain length
(ingoing and outgoing) and the longest infection chain (ingoing
and outgoing). All calculations were carried out using R statistical
computing [48] and the packages ‘EpiContactTrace’ [29] for
infection chains and igraph 0.5.5–3 [49] for all other network
metrics. Time series were analysed using the Bfast analysis,
implemented in the R package ‘bfast 2.1–19 [50] to track network
changes over the full study period despite highly seasonal
fluctuations in network activity. Changes in maximum and
average infection chain lengths for all nodes were tracked over
time using a Bfast analysis. Bfast was originally developed for use
with remotely sensed data and uses a generic change detection
approach which relies on a piecewise linear model to decompose a
time-series into its trend, seasonal and residual components.
Comparative analysis: infected vs. non-infected
farms. To test whether farms which became infected during
the 2011 HPAI epizootic were more connected or central than
uninfected farms, their degree and betweenness were compared
using Wilcoxon sign rank tests. Similar analysis was conducted for
infection chain lengths (in and out) beginning at the time of
infection and running for 8 months directly prior to the outbreak.
We used 8 months because September 2010 was identified as the
potential time of introduction of the HPAI virus in the region by
Abolnik et al. [42], using molecular clock analysis based on virus
DNA mutation rates.
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